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If the 1970s (in contrast to the optimistic 'sixties) were
the decade of pessimism, in academic circles, about
the prospects for capitalist development at the periphery,
then it was the diffusion to the rest of the world of the
gloomy views of the Latin American dependency
school that was largely to blame.
Soon, however, the pendulum began to swing in the
opposite direction in recent years the dependency
approach has come under sustained attack in the
literature cg Warren 1973, Lall 1975, Leys 19771, and
its predictions have ostensibly been challenged by the
rapid economic growth achieved recently by a number
of underdeveloped countries, such as Brazil, South
Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. This issue of the Bulletin
looks at the question of whether the dependency
approach can now in fact be pronounced dead. It
consists partly of articles evaluating either the approach
in general or the work of particular theorists, and
partly of articles considering the implications of the
experience and prospects of five reasonably successful
peripheral economiesIran, Costa Rica. South Korea,
Singapore and Ireland.
There is some dispute about the origins of the school.
In the popularised version
two principal currents are general/v cited. ECLA
(the UN Economic Commission for Latin America)
and the Marxian and neo-Marxian North Americans
(Baran, Sweezv and Frank). It is added, at times.
that the dependent islas.......esent different
ideological standings. according to their proximili'
to ECLA (and to the peur-bourgeois nationalismS
which is supposed to hare derived from the ECLA
studies) or to their more authentic opposition to
capitalism, and hence their proximiti' to the thought
of the Marxian economists referred to above.
ICardoso 1977:21
Cardoso justifiably objects to this version. which gives
inadequate weight to the longstanding tradition of
Marxian thought in Latin America, to internal political
debates within Latin Amthcan countriesand particu-
larly within their Communist partieson the role to
be played by the national bourgeoisie, and to the
influence of the Cuban revolution.
However, although the importance of ECLA in the
development of dependency thinking may tend to be
exaggerated, there is no denying that its economists
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anticipated the dependency approach in various ways.
Indeed the development economists of the fifties in
general (Singer, Lewis, Mandelbaum, Rosenstein-Rodan
and Nurkse, as well as Prebisch and his ECLA colleagues)
were important in this respect in their prescription of
disengagement from the international capitalist
systemat least to the extent of planned. capitalist,
import-substituting industrialisation behind a tariff or
quota wall.
Parts of their theory survive more or less intact among
dependency and underdevelopment theorists. For
instance, the Emmanuel/Amin theory of unequal
exchange could be regarded as a restatement in Marxist
language of the Prebisch/Singer/Lewis analysis of the
differing effects of productivity increases at centre
and periphery arising from the differing degrees of
competition in their product and labour markets. But,
in common with other development economists and
unlike the later dependency school, ECLA operated
with a Harrod/Domar type of planning model and
therefore looked favourably on foreign investment
and aid as a means of easing the capital constraint. As
well as adding to the capacity to import capital goods,
foreign capital was seen as helping the balance of
payments, reducing inflationary pressures and trans-
ferring technology.
Even Nurkse envisaged a role for foreign capital.
although he was one of the few early development
economists to anticipate the dependency emphasis on
problems arising from non-trade contacts between
central and peripheral countries. He pointed to the
international demonstration effect arising from the
spread of knowledge in underdeveloped countries of
the consumption standards of rich countries. Drawing
a parallel with Duesenberrys work on the inter-
dependence of individual consumption functions. Nurkse
suggested that 'the presence or the mere knowledge of
new goods and new methods of consumption tends to
raise the general propensity to consumeS and that ihe
temptation to copy American consumption patterns
tends to limit the supply of investible funds by inhibiting
the willingness to save. There is an obvious affinity
here with the later emphasis on consumption patterns
of. say, Sunkel or Furtado. but there is a difference.
Nurkse was still operating within a Harrod/Doirar
framework and thus emphasising the demonstration
effect only on the rate of saving and hence on the rate
of growth. He recognised that disengagement from
the international economy was logically implied by his
analysis but regarded this as a 'defeatist solution',
preferring to try to raise the rate of saving by a
compulsory saving scheme, backed up by foreign
investment and aid.
lt is not, perhaps, surprising that the development
economists who seem to get closest to the dependency
position are those who question the Harrod/Domar
emphasis on capital as the sole constraint and emphasise
rather the inadequacy of the inducement to invest.
For example, Myrdal (whose 'circular-causation'
challenge to equilibrium economics is an unacknow-
ledged influence on dependency and 'uneven deve-
lopment' theory) drew attention to the fact that the
need for capital in underdeveloped countries
does not represent an effective demand in the
capital market. Rather, if there were no exchange
controls and if, at the sjne time, there were no
elements in their national development policies
securing high profits for capitalie if the forces in
the capital market were given unhampered play -
capitalists in underdeveloped countries would be
exporting capital. IMyrdal 1957:53!
If the problem is seen to be on the side of the
inducement to invest rather than of the supply of
capital, then the logic of inviting an inflow of foreign
capital is called into question. Hirschman 11971:227!
raised this question explicitly: 'Could the inflow of
foreign capital stunt what might otherwise be vigorous
local development of the so-called missing or scarce
factors of production?' His view was that it could-
sometimes in an absolute sense, for instance through
the foreign takeover of local banks or businesses,
more often in relation to what might have happened in
the absence of the foreign investment. His evidence
for this was the fact that during wars, depressions,
national expropriations and international sanctions,
the domestic supply of entrepreneurs, managers,
technology and saving seems to be 'far more elastic
than is ever suspected under business-as-usual condi-
tions.' His conclusion that 'a policy of selective liquidation
and withdrawal of foreign private investment' would
be in the best interests of Latin America would be
endorsed by most dependency authors.
Where members of the dependency school part company
from development economists (often their earlier selves)
is in their rejection of modernisation theory: their
analysis of the nation state not in isolation but in the
context of the global evolution of capitalism: their
incorporation of1 a strong historical dimension into
their analysis; their endogenisation of the state as 'the
crucial battleground between the different social groups'
I Sunkel 1979:29 I; and their use of a dialectical rather
than an equilibrium mode of analysis. This difference
in approach is reflected in the different set of questions
2
addressed by them. The most important of these
questions, assumed away by 'modernisationist' develop-
ment economists is: 'What are the limits on capitalist
developmeñt at the periphery?"
The typical dependency answer to this question is, as
already indicated, a gloomy one. None is more gloomy
than Gunder Frank, perhaps unfortunately the author
who has come to symbolise the dependency approach
for readers outside Latin America. As Booth has
pointed out jOxaal et al 1975 j Frank's analysis is less
mechanistic and metropole-oriented than is usually
supposed, emphasising 'the impregnation of the satellite's
domestic economy with the same capitalist structure
and its fundamental contradictions' as more important
than 'the drain of economic surplus from satellite to
metropolis with which he is usually associated I Frank
1967:101. However, he remains strongly insistent on
the impossibility of capitalist development at the
periphery:
the economic basis of a derelopmentalist national
bourgeois class.., has been entirely eliminated or
prevented from forming at all, thus precluding
further or future development under capitalism...
short of socialist revolution. I Frank 1978: lOI
While critical of Frank, most of the more orthodoxly
Marxian dependency authors share his scepticism
about the prospects for capitalist development at the
periphery. For example, Dos Santos j 1973 j would put
more emphasis than does Frank on the elements
within a nation which determine the effects of
international situations upon national reality and on
the assimilation of the national bourgeoisie by foreign
capital in the role of 'dominated dominators' and less
on the surplus drain. He also emphasises the inability
of peripheral societies to develop a capital goods
sector as a defining characteristic. However, he would
agree that capitalist development or at least autonomous
capitalist development is not possible and that a socialist
paih offers the only escape for peripheral societies.
Similar conclusions are reached via a different route
by those who analyse the plight of the periphery
largely in terms of 'unequal exchange'. Thus Amin
119781 describes his 'peripheral model', based on low-
wage exports and (in the consequent absence of an
internal mass market) on the production of luxury
goods for internal demand, with 'new' mechanisms of
domination by transnational corporations superimposed:
and regards it as a 'dead end', with no possibility of
transition to a 'self-centred' system based on production
of mass-consumption and capital goods. He sees self-
The question was never perhaps directly addressed at this level of
generality by the dependentistas. Much of their work was geographically
localised and historically circumscribed, but this is the general
question implicit in that work.
reliance, therefore, as a necessary strategy for transition
to socialism. Marini 1972:14 extends a similar analysis
to 'subimperialism' ('the form which dependent capitalism
assumes upon reaching the stage of monopolies and
finance capital') in Brazil. In this case the low-wage
exports are of manufactured goods and the state takes
an increasingly important role (in conjunction with
foreign capital), but the whole system is crucially
dependent on the superexploitation of labour. Successful
pursuit of wage demands by urban and rural workers
would 'close all exits for capitalist development in
Brazil'.
Perhaps the gloomiest vision belongs to the 'marginality'
writers within the dependency school, such as Quijano
1974J and Nun 19691. In their view, the new 'hegemonic'
monopolistic sectors are grafted on to, but not integrated
with, the Latin American production matrix, bringing
it permanently to the verge of breakdown. They
suggest that competitive and monopoly capitalism are
crucially different from each other, as far as labour
absorption possibilities are concerned. Under com-
petitive capitalism, technical change causes a fall in
product price, which leads to a rise in demand for the
product, which leads in turn to a rise in the demand for
labour. Under monopoly capitalism, on the other
hand, technical change does not result in a fall in price
but partly in an increase in profits, partly in an increase
in wages, which encourages stagnation in the demand
for labour. Moreover, the fact that increases in
productivity stem from technical change and not (as
in Marx) from a lengthening in the working day breaks
the link between surplus population and increases in
productivity. And the fact that the labour force in the
hegemonic sector is a non-competing group breaks
the link with wage determination. So surplus population,
on this analysis, is not a reserve but an excluded (and
permanently excluded) labour force. This 'marginalised'
labour force or 'marginal mass' is a non-functional
surplus population - over and above what is necessary
to perform a Marxian industrial-reserve-army role.
This is a profoundly pessimistic. even catastrophic,
vision, not only questioning the employment-generating
performance of peripheral capitalism, but also denying
its capacity to perform a historically progressive role.
The Caribbean dependency school (reviewed by Pantin
below) is on the whole less pessimistic about the
possibilities of capitalist development, as long as the
plantation economy model is replaced by a localised
or 'people's capitalisme A notable exception is Thomas
119741, who points to the way in which colonialism led
to a separation of the pattern and growth of domestic
resource use from the pattern and growth of domestic
demand: and to divergence between domestic demand
and the needs of the broad mass of the population.
Even in the case of the most successful small capitalist
economies at the periphery, he sees no real possibility
of development 'beyond misleading rises in per capita
income or indeed of even sustaining such advances on
a long-term basis. . . unless a comprehensive socialist
strategy is developed' I Thomas 1974: 106 J. He recognises,
however, in 'some of the larger economies the possibility
of indigenous capitalist development of productive
forces as a genuine alternative to socialism.
Perhaps the most complex member of the dependency
school, so critical in his more recent writing of most of
its conclusions as almost to place himself outside it, is
Cardoso. Like other dependentistas. he emphasises
the absence of capital goods and financial sectors, the
import of technology and penetration by foreign
enterprises as characteristics of dependency. which
he defines as the situation 'when the accumulation
and expansion of capital cannot find its essential
dynamic component within the system' ICardoso and
Faletto 1979:XXJ. However, he sees the relationship
between external and internal forces as forming a
complex whole whose structural links are not based
on mere externalforms of exploitation and coercion,
but are rooted in coincidences of interests between
local dominant classes and international ones and,
on the other side, are challenged by local dominated
groups and classes.
I Cardoso and Faletto 1979:XVIJ
Most important in the context of this Bulletin, he
refuses to place theoretical limits on capitalist
development at the periphery. He sees dependent
capitalism as capable of growth and of transforming
social relations of production, although not of resolving
the employment and poverty problems of the majority
of the population. He insists, however, on the need to
analyse particular situations rather than to develop
general theories:
we do not tn to place theoretical limits on the
probable course offuture events. These will depend,
not on academic predictions, but on collective
action guided by political wills thai make work
what is structurall' bare/v possible.
Cardoso and Faletto:175J
Which brings us to the question posed by this issue of
the Bulletin: is dependency dead? The question can,
of course, have various meanings. For instance: are
the questions raised by the dependency school no
longer of interest? Is the particular approach to answering
those questions followed by members of the school no
longer useful? Does the recent experience of a large
number of developing economies refute the predictions
of and therefore discredit the dependency school?
The articles in this issue try to address all three of
these questions in different ways.
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The questions raised by the dependency school can be
reduced essentially to two: what are the limits on
capitalist development at the periphery, and, in
determining those limits, what is the relative importance
of external and internal variables, and how do these
variables interact with each other? These questions
seem to our contributors to be very much alive,
although. as Bienefeld points out, there is a need for
greater precision about the meaning both of 'capitalist
development' and of the 'periphery'.
The answer to the second questionwhether the
dependency approach is any longer usefulis rather
less clear. None of our contributors would presumably
want to revert, on the one hand, to the view of
neoclassical economics and modernisation theory that
integration into the international capitalist system is
always beneficial: or. on the other, to a faith in the
'progressive' role of the national bourgeoisie. Nor,
however, would they accept the crude stagnationism
which many critics of dependency seem to assume to
constitute the entirety of the approach. Pantin's
conclusion that the Caribbean plantation economy
model is in need of searching analysis would be
accepted as applicable to the whole dependency
approach. And, while Cardoso might be seen as
comparing favourably with Frank on grounds of subtlety,
both' Bienefeld and Rodriguez emphasise that the
retreat from theory which he represents leaves enormous
problems for those who want to go beyond posihoc
description.
As for the five country case-studies, they certainly
represent a challenge to the cruder versionsof the liulletin.
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dependency approach. Those of Costa Rica. Ireland
and Singapore emphasise that for very small economies
there may be no realistic alternative to dependent
integration into the international capitalist system as
an exporter of primary products or of manufactured
goods: and that the benefits from such integration
may, under certain circumstances, not be negligible.
The Iranian case can certainly not be described as one
of stagnation; the Cardosan description of 'dependent
development' seems to fit it better. Finally, what of
South Korea, which might be regarded as posing the
greatest threat to those who deny the capacity of
another Third World economy to emulate Japan and
become an internationally competitive industrial power?
Dependency thinking has hardly been useful so far in
explaining its emergence as a newly industrialising
country. but in a modified form such thinking is seen
as likely to throw up interesting questions about the
Korean case.
The conclusion, then, of the articles here would seem
to be that the 'straw man' of stagnationist dependencia
is certainly dead; but that the questions raised by the
dependenuistas are still important; and that a start has
been made in modifying the approach in a direction
that would enable such cases as South Korea to be
predicted rather than treated as ad hoc and special.
However, there is a long way to go before such a
theory of the articulation of external and internal
variables in determining limits on capitalist development
is successfully developed.
note: for references, see bibliography at the end of this
